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Abstract
Protection of user privacy is an important issue of Web
applications. Data encryption presents a possible resolu-
tion for improving the security level of Web applications. In
this paper, we propose a novel mechanism using broadcast
encryption and account assignment methods to reduce the
decryption cost of Web applications. A notable feature of
our mechanism is that the additional function of the appli-
cation server is not necessary. Moreover, it is easy to ap-
ply this method to existing servers to improve their security
level. We also show some experimental results to demon-
strate the feasibility of our methods.
1. Introduction
Web applications have become notable platforms for the
innovative service and Consumer Generated Media (CGM)
because they facilitate data sharing and collaboration. How-
ever, currently, most Web applications allow the applica-
tion server (provider) to access user data and use such data
for other purposes. In [4] Davida et al. have pointed this:
These problems are because the DBMS knows what data it
is manipulating. Therefor it is necessary to preserve the en-
crypted user data in the server and avoid data inspection
with the server, for solving the privacy problem and en-
abling the user to use the Web application easily and safety.
Not only that, it is neccessary to keep the access author-
ity information confidential because access analysis makes
servers extrapolate the importance of each data and the pri-
ority of users.
As techniques to accomplish those objectives, two direc-
tions have been studied. One is the study of methods of
retrieving encryption data preserved in server; the other is
the study of delivery of the encryption key and data. Among
methods of retrieving encryption data preserved in a server
[7, 8], an encrypted relational database, that allows retrieval
of encrypted data, has been achieved for each tuple by pro-
ducing a secure index. Among methods of delivery of the
encryption key and data [3, 6, 9], the number of encryption
keys that each user have to manage is reduced by publishing
information of data-sharing group and making the user hier-
archy. In this paper, we consider to share the encrypted data
and discuss the method of reducing decryption cost without
any regard for user hierarchy because in Web application
users most always are equivalent.
The naive method of bringing in access authority for en-
crypted data is described as follows. Data entry e is en-
crypted with key ke of the common key cryptosystem. The
encrypted key chain, which is the individually encrypted ke
used to encrypt the data entry e with the public key of users
who are permitted to have access is added to the encryption
data. Only user allowd to access the data can decrypt and
get ke therefore can get the e. However, this method re-
quires many keys proportional to the number of the autho-
rize users. Until trying decryption, user cannot know which
data in the key chain is able to be decrypted or no data is
able to be decrypted because of he/she does not have au-
thority. In short, the long key chain requires the necessary
of decrypting many data.
For reducing key chain, a key is allocated at each com-
bination of the user groups. For exsample, let us consider
the case of four users, the number of the possible combi-
nation group is fifteen. We make in advance fifteen kinds
of different keys and assign each key to each group. Data
entry e is encrypted with the key assigned for that group,
therefore the key chain length is always one. However, in
this way, the number of keys increases explosively in pro-
portion to the number of users. Damiani et al. introduced
the way of reducing the number of keys in [3]. They do not
create all possible keys but actually used keys by registering
the static data-sharing group firstly. They also extended to a
dynamic condition in [6]. These methods require to publish
the authorized users for each data, but this constraint is not
enough for protecting user privacy.
The weak points of these conventional methods can be
summarized as follows.
• The decryption cost will increase when the encrypted
key chain containing access authority information
grows.
• The presence of the access authority will not be certi-
fied until the encrypted key chain is decrypted. There-
fore, it is also necessary to try decryption of data for
which one has no access authority.
In this paper, as one solution, we propose a method to re-
duce the cost of decrypting key chain by using pairing-
based broadcast encryption and method to reduce the num-
ber of trying to decrypte the data which is not allowed to
access by account assignment. The proposed methods do
not require special functions of application server. There-
fore, it is readily applicable to conventional Web application
servers. The experimental results validates the feasibility of
our methods.
2. Overview and Basic notions
In this section, at first, we introduce the basic notions
used in this paper. Then we give the overview of our mech-
anism for reducing the encryption cost of Web applications.
2.1. Data Decryption Cost
It is necessary to decrypt the encrypted key chain con-
taining the access authority information of all data entries
to examine the presence of the access authority, when the
user want to acquire some data entries. The best case, in
which we just need one time for key decryption, is that the
key containing the right user access authority is the first item
of the encrypted key chain. On the other hand, in the worst
case that we do not have access authority of any item, al-
though we decrypted all of the key chain, we cannot obtain
any key and any data entry. Generally, the decryption cost
cost(u) of user u can be defined as follows.
cost(u) = L¯×N(u) (1)
where, L¯ is the average size of encrypted key chain. N(u)
denotes the number of times user should try decrypting to
examine the presence of the authority. We propose the
method of reducing both L¯ and N(u) to reduce the decryp-
tion cost.
Figure 1. Users and accounts
2.2. User Account and Account Reference
In a Web application, the notion of user account is used
to manage data clusters. A user account is authenticated
using ID and password. The data clusters used in Web ap-
plication are generated based on the user account. In this
paper, we use the notion of user account for access author-
ity management of data, rather than user identification of
the conventional Web applications. A user agent will man-
age the ID and password of each user account. The user
account is not assigned to end user but data cluster. Con-
sequently, users cannot access their accounts without the
agent and cannot perform operations that not allowed to that
account by the system. The user agent also provide user
identification mechanism instead of the mechanism using
user account.
Account reference information signifies the correspon-
dence relationship between user accounts and a user. It de-
notes which user accounts the user has; user accounts are
expected to include data items which are accessible by that
user. The account reference information is prepared in ad-
vance. For instance, when account1 and account2 are in
the information of the reference to the account of user1,
data to which user1 has access authority are preserved only
in these two accounts. Hence, it is not necessary to go to
refer other accounts. As a result, the number of data en-
tries that a user is expected to examine for the presence of
the access authority can be decreased. In addition, in our
mechanism, any user can read and write the account refer-
ence information of other users.
The relation between users ant accounts is illustrated in
figure 1. Each user references some accounts and each ac-
counts stores some data entries.
2.3. Architecture and Dataflow
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of the Web applica-
tion server based on our mechanism. When a user tries to
add a data entry, the user agent in figure 2 will works as
follows.
1. The data entry and its access information (the users
who are allowed to access this data entry) will be
Figure 2. Architecture and Dataflow
passed to the Query Processor, which is working on
the client site.
2. Query Processor passes Broadcast Encryption Proces-
sor information about the users who have been given
the access authority.
3. Broadcast Encryption Processor acquires these user’s
public keys from Service Provider and generates ac-
cess authority information for each user.
4. Query Processor acquires account reference informa-
tion from Service Provider. Then it decides the ac-
count that should preserve the added data entry using
the method described in chapter 3.2.2.
5. Query Processor adds secure indices described in [7]
etc. and finally sends these data to Service Provider.
Currently, Query Processor processes the query on the
encrypted database based using that secure indices. Using
the private key, it examine the access authority for each data
entries among the query results. Only data entries that have
the access authority will be returned to the client or end user.
3. Broadcast Encryption and Account Assign-
ment
This section introduces two methods: account assign-
ment for reducing the times of decryption, and pairing-
based broadcast encryption for fixing the key length.
3.1. Fixing key-length
One problem of the conventional methods is that the
encrypted key chain containing access authority informa-
tion grows to such a great degree in some cases. It makes
the decryption inefficient, because, to examine the presence
of the authority, it becomes necessary in the worst case to
try decryption to all key information. Therefore, we apply
pairing-based broadcast encryption [2] to fix the key length.
As a result, decryption to examine the presence of the au-
thority needs to be done only once.
The pairing function f is defined on a elliptic function
and it has two input and one output arguments. Recently,
the use of pairing for public-key cryptography is actively
studied [5]. Pairing-based Broadcast Encryption [2] is a
method that enables a key chain, as an access authority,
to be bound by one key independently of the number of
authorized users. Security of this pairing-based broadcast
encryption boils down to the question of l−BDHE assump-
tion. Assuming the hardness of l−BDHE assumption, our
method has high security and can be proven [2].
The broadcasting encryption approach requires to spec-
ify the number of users for creating public/private key pairs.
Therefore, given the possibility of adding a user in the fu-
ture, the following enhancement is necessary.
• Set the number of users to enough large at initializa-
tion.
• Create and reserve a lot of public and private key pairs
for further usage. When a user has been added, assign
the key pair from the reserved ones.
When there is no more reserved key pair, we create mul-
tiple access authority information by using broadcast en-
cryption. By this method, the key pair of broadcast encryp-
tion increases and, eventually, access authority information
will increase if the number of users increases. However,
generally, if n is enough large then the frequency of creat-
ing a new key pair is less than the increase of users.
3.2. Reducing Decryption Candidate Data
The encrypted key chain containing access authority in-
formation can be replaced with a single key using broad-
cast encryption. Therefore, a decryption frequency neces-
sary to examine the presence of the authority is one time
always. However, we need to try decryption all the can-
didate data (encrypted key chains) to confirm whether we
have access authority. That is to say, the N(u) is still large
and the cost(u) is high (Function (1)). Hence, we propose
a user assignment method to reduce the encryption candi-
dates. The basic idea is that, a user is assigned to the user
account which containing fewer data entries s/he does not
have access authority.
3.2.1 Available Information for Account Assignment
It is important that sharing data among the users only and
server should not be allowed to access the users’ data. If
user information on certain data are added as a plaintext, it
is understood which users are sharing data For that reason,
the relation of the user will be discovered. Consequently,
information on the data sharing cannot be used for account
assignment. However, a user who adds data knows about
the user to whom he gives the access authority. Therefore,
the account assignment is done according at the time when
data are added. Moreover, any user can access the account
reference information, as described in Chapter 2.2. This ac-
count reference information is useful for account allocation.
3.2.2 Assignment Algorithm
The bias of the data included in a user account from account
reference information is presumed as follows. Therefore,
it is inferred that much data has already been preserved in
the account when n is large. Furthermore, when users who
are referring to a certain account are few, it is inferred that
the amount of data preserved in the account is little. Put
simply, it is assumed that the amount of data in the account
is associated with the number of account references. It is
also assumed that if an account to which a certain user refers
increases, then the user has no access authority to any of the
data included in the account at that time.
Therefore, a cost is generated when the product of the
user who refers newly to the number of data included in the
account and the account adds data to the account. For some
account a, let n+a be the number of users who have already
referred to account a and let nS−a be the number of the users
in S who have not referred to account a. The cost of account
a in the set of users S is defined as follows.
CostS(a) = (n+a )
k · nS−a (k : constant) (2)
When the account that adds data is selected, data are al-
located to the account with the smallest cost.
4. Experimental Evaluation
We performed an evaluation experiment by the simu-
lation to confirm the effectiveness of the technique using
broadcast encryption and the account assignment proposed
in this paper. In this section, we first explain the model of
the user relation used in simulation, and then describe the
experiment method and the result.
4.1. Friendship and Data-sharing Model
In our simulation, the user friendship relation is set as a
scale-free friendship graph; data-sharing groups are deter-
mined based on this relation. In the graph representing this
friendship relation, a node and an edge denote a user and an
friendship, respectively. For example, user1 in Figure 3(a)
has friendship with user2, user3, · · · , user8. That friend-
ship graph is made on the BA-model [1], and data-sharing
groups are made by the following process using that graph:
(a) Friendship Graph (b) Data-sharing Group
Figure 3. Friendship and Data-sharing Model
1. Choose a node which has not been chosen in a friend-
ship graph Gn.
2. Judge whether the selected node will be the head of a
new group or not with a probability that is biased so
that it is proportional to the number of links.
3. Choose a node connected to some node in the group.
4. Judge whether the chosen node will belong to the
group with a probability that is biased so that it is in-
versely proportional to the number of links.
Because of the assumption that the more friends a user has,
the more opportunity for a head there is, choosing a head in
step 2) is based on a probability that is biased: it is directly
related to the number of links. That is also because of the
assumption that the more friends a user has, the greater the
probability of belonging to some group already. The judg-
ment whether to be belong to the group in step 4) is based
on a probability that is biased so that it is inversely related
to the number of links.
Figure 3(b) portrays a case in which the user1 was cho-
sen at step 1) and became a leader of a new group. In ad-
dition, at step 3) user2, user3, · · · , user8 are chosen, and
user3, user4, user7 and user8 belong to one group. More-
over, user9, user10, · · · , user12, which were connected to
user8 added to group as a head, are chosen at the step 3)
and user9 and user12 belong to one group.
4.2. Simulation and Result
For the simulation, data-sharing groups are created by
the user model explained above including 100, 1, 000 and
10, 000 users. Respectively the procedure of creating
groups is executed for three times in each case because of
the need to produce many more groups. Each group shares
data of the number that is proportional to the number of
members. As a result, we calculated the length of the en-
crypted key chain and the precision of the access authority.
We also calculated the distribution of the account reference
# of Naive method Our method
No. groups key chain avg. precision precision
100 users
1 112 19.0328 0.190328 0.981911
2 107 16.8371 0.168371 0.991164
3 55 13.6349 0.136349 0.790000
1, 000 users
1 1034 27.2675 0.0272675 0.987987
2 1083 30.9286 0.0309286 0.984673
3 1056 31.0023 0.0310023 0.984935
10, 000 users
1 10563 42.4664 0.00424664 0.988050
2 10432 44.4462 0.00444462 0.989989
3 10642 39.9114 0.00399114 0.988845
Table 1. Result of simulation
and the precision of the access authority. Here, the precision
of the access authority is the rate of the number of the data
checked for permission and the number of permitted data.
Let Check(useri) be the number of the data useri must
check to gain permission and Auth(useri) be the number
of data useri has authority to; the precision of the access





The results of this simulation are presented in Table 1.
The authority precisions were calculated for the worst case
in which each user checks all data the user can get. Accord-
ing to Table 1, it is obvious that our approach can check
for permission with only one decryption in any case and
the precision of our approach is high. Therefore, in our ap-
proach, useless decryptions are executed in few cases.
In figure 4, the horizontal axis shows the number of ac-
count references and the vertical axis shows the precision
of the access authority. In that figure, the users are also de-
picted in the corresponding place as a point. Many account
references engender a high cost of connection. According to
the result, the number of account references in our approach
remain at lower values, which is the preferred outcome.
5. Data protection on Web application
When apply our methods to Web applications, two
important issues will pertain: 1) Who creates the pub-
lic/private key pair for broadcast encryption? 2) How are
the keys delivered? We will discuss these two issues in this
section. Hereafter, n denotes the total number of the users;
the users are many because of Chapter 3.1. In addition, each
useri has a key pair (pubi, privatei) of a usual public key
cryptosystem.
Figure 5. Setup of the account
5.1. User Account Setup
First, the user account is prepared in the number of users
n; it is assumed to be of a1, a2, · · · , an. Only account ai
is made to be referred for useri at first; ai is called the
home account of useri and useri is called the owner of ac-
count ai. Moreover, data for which the account owner has
no access authority are assumed not to be preserved in each
account. Each user should have account reference informa-
tion on the server to perform account assignment. Then,
users will preserve account reference information in their
own home accounts. The pair of the public/private key of
pairing-based broadcast encryption is made as the owner of
each account. For instance, useri computes the public key
information P (ai)1 , P
(ai)
2 , · · · , P (ai)n and private key. The
resultant public key information is preserved in account ai,
and the private key of userj is encrypted with key pubj ,
which is open to the public as a past public key cryptosys-
tem; it is preserved in the home account of userj .
Figure 5 shows the situation in which the data are pre-
served in account ai. Public information for made broad-
cast encryption and information ai, aj , · · · , ak of reference
to account of useri who is owner is preserved. Moreover,
the data naturally allocated in ai are preserved.
Because useri generates private key in each user’s ac-
count ai, useri has all users’ private keys. However, from
the condition; A owner of each account has access author-
ity for all data preserved in the account, even owner of ai
has other users’ private keys, it is unquestionable because
useri has at first the access authorities of all data in account
ai. Moreover, useri manages the private key where the user
does not exist now because it produces many keys. The key
is encrypted and transmitted to a new user’s account, as de-
scribed above, when the number of users increases.
5.2. Encrypting Data Entry
The data are encrypted and preserved in the server as fol-
lows when useri adds a new data entry e which is shared
among user set S. First, preservation account a of e is de-
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Figure 4. Distribution of users
according to the method described in section 3.2.2. Next,
public keys of users in S are gathered and e is encrypted by
broadcast encryption with there keys. Finally, the account
reference list is updated for the user who was not referring
to account a to her/his referring in further.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel mechanism using
broadcast encryption and account assignment methods to
reduce the decryption cost of Web applications. The pro-
posed technique is easily applied to Web applications. Ad-
ditional function of existing Web application server is un-
necessary. We described how to solve two issues: 1) Who
creates the public/private key pair in broadcast encryption?
2) How are the keys delivered? Through simulation and
evaluation, we demonstrated our approach can keep the cost
of decryption low for any user or any group. Especially,
unnecessary decryption of ungrantable data was reduced to
10% or less.
In our approach, data and the sharing groups are ex-
pected to increase. Therefore, cancellation of the shar-
ing relation according to data deletion remains as a sub-
ject for future research. Users will be able to decrease the
number of account references because the sharing relation
is canceled. However, for decreasing account references,
information related to how much data that each user has
access authority to in each preserved account is needed.
Achievement of synchronization and the transaction on the
encrypted database is necessary to manage such data on the
server. Efficient and secure transaction processing can be
achieved by preparing an encrypted log file and using the
method described herein.
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